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1. Introduction
In contrast to traditional societies, modern pluralist societies can no longer take 
agreements for granted. On a societal level, it almost seems as if dissent with regard 
to moral questions is quite normal, while moral consensus represents an exceptional 
phenomenon (MacIntyre 1984: 6, Gordijn 2001: 225-226). Because of the field work 
of social scientists and far greater opportunities for travel and communication, we 
are now more aware than ever before that different social and historical cultures 
regard different actions as permissible or impermissible. Indeed, there are also 
intractable moral disagreements in every society. Here are some examples: Should 
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death penalty be permitted? Should abortion and euthanasia be allowed? Should 
homosexual couples be allowed to marry or adopt children? Should prostitution 
be legalized? Should surrogate motherhood be allowed? Is it morally acceptable 
to eat animals or should we all become vegans? Should consumption of alcohol be 
permitted in public places? Are people free to express their views or should hate 
speech be prohibited?
In all these cases of moral disagreements underlie divergent views as to what 
policies should be adopted. As these disagreements involve some values and the 
‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ distinction, they therefore fall under a category of normative 
disagreements. The parties involved in normative disagreements not only disagree 
about the handling of the issue under dispute, but also about the correct justificatory 
reasons for their contrary claims.
Moral disagreements have both theoretical and practical implications. The lack 
of decisive arguments in support of one’s position on these controversial issues 
may lead one to suspect that some moral issues have no objectively true answers; 
that moral principles are relative to a society (relativism) or even to an individual 
(subjectivism). Even under ideal conditions, when all parties arguing about moral 
questions are knowledgeable and rational, we cannot expect unanimity in judgements. 
This makes some ethicists ask whether ethical judgements are answerable to anything 
independent of them. One possible explanation is that there simply is no objective 
reality (moral facts) that can be captured by our moral judgements. 
The argument from disagreement has motivated various antirealist views: 
Mackie’s error theory (Mackie 1977); the expressivist tradition (Stevenson 1963, 
Hare 1963, Williams 1985, Blackburn 1998, 1999, Gibbard 2003) as well as forms 
of relativism (Harman 1975, 2000, Dreier 2009). Realists in ethics (McNaughton 
1988, Brink 1989, McGrath 2007, Shafer-Landau 2005) have replied in one or 
more ways: (1) we have no access to existing moral truths (2) existing disagreement 
is merely verbal or apparent; (3) some disagreements are due to objective value 
incommensurability; (4) local irresolvable disagreements exist, but entail no 
metaphysical consequences for ethics as a whole.
On the other hand, persistent moral disagreements raise the practical question 
as to how to manage our coexistence with those whose opinions we do not share 
(Archard 2012, Ceva 2016, Gowans 2000, Hanrick and Druckman 2017, Mason 
2018, Wong 1992, 1995). The consequences of moral, political, and religious 
disagreements can be very serious, as conflicts can overflow state boundaries and 
even lead to war. It has been suggested that consensus resolves disagreement in an 
epistemic sense, while compromise resolves disagreement in the practical sense as it 
prevents the potentially negative consequences from occurring (Spang 2017).
What we should aim toward in moral debates is what Marino calls “case 
consistency”: judging similar cases similarly (Marino 2015). The same applies to 
our judgements about overall obligations. People may fail to judge cases consistently 
because they may be distorted by emotions, self-interest or other biases. Here 
improved reasoning and focusing on case consistency can help. But in relation to 
moral matters we cannot expect agreement in all cases as people direct and prioritize 
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values differently and there can be multiple internally coherent moral systems that 
do not agree with one another (Marino 2017: 482). I think that even if this does not 
bring us closer to consensus, it is important to be aware of why we cannot resolve 
disagreements even if each party is reasoning well.
The main aim of my paper is to explain the source of moral disagreements and 
clarify their nature. An adequate reaction to a disagreement requires knowing which 
type of disagreement we are confronted with. I claim that several moral disagreements 
are deep conceptual disagreements for the resolution of the disagreement requires 
the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually unavailable to them. 
Although deep disagreements are not subject to rational resolution, there is still a 
rational way to deal with them. We can attempt to bring the framework propositions 
and concepts that lie at the bottom of deep disagreements to the surface and discuss 
them directly (Fogelin 1985: 5). Even if we cannot resolve a disagreement, it is 
important to understand why we disagree and why we cannot come to an agreement 
through the use of argument. Consensus or compromise can evolve from considering 
the other possible points of view.
My paper consists of three parts. In the first part I will analyse what is the 
specificity of moral disagreements and over what do we disagree. In the second part 
I will deal with different conceptions of value and show what the empirical studies 
show about relativity or universality of values. In the third part, I will suggest that 
there are at least four possible sources of moral disagreements: different concepts of 
good life, related to our identities, incommensurable fundamental values, different 
motivating reasons, and different concepts of morality.
2. What is specific about moral disagreements?
Noticing that one is in disagreement with other people over some fact in a matter 
may lead one to think that his/her belief is false. When does this happen? Bryan 
Frances and Jonathan Matheson (2018) explain the epistemological implications of 
disagreement as follows: 
If learning that a large number and percentage of your epistemic peers 
or superiors disagree with you should probably make you lower your 
confidence in your belief, then learning that those same individuals agree 
with you should probably make you raise your confidence in your belief – 
provided they have greater confidence in it than you did before you found 
out about their agreement.
In order to judge how likely one is to be correct with respect to a given proposition, 
one has to judge one’s epistemic position. The main disagreement factors, which 
help to determine one’s epistemic position, are the following: data, evidence brought 
to bear on answering the question, cognitive ability and other intellectual virtues 
possessed while answering the question, relevant background knowledge, relevant 
biases, attentiveness and time devoted to answering the question (Frances 2014: 32). 
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It is due to these disagreement factors that reasonable people may have reasonable 
but contrary beliefs. One’s epistemic position describes how likely it is that one’s 
judgement of a certain belief is correct. Depending on whether one believes that the 
persons who disagree with him/her over a certain belief are one’s peers, superiors or 
inferiors, one either tends to stick with his/her belief or not.1
However, all this is not very helpful in case of moral disagreements. It has 
been pointed out by Frances and Matheson (2018) that in many real-world cases 
of disagreement it is not easy to judge which party is better positioned to answer 
the question at hand. The question of whether to seek experts’ advice to solve peer 
disagreement about moral matters has led some philosophers to moral skepticism, 
because moral experts are impossible to identify (McGrath 2007, Decker and 
Groll 2013).
Although there may be moral disagreements that can be resolved when factual 
disagreement is removed or errors in reasoning have been detected, quite often 
moral conflicts persist despite agreement over empirical facts. In these cases, the 
commonsense recipe seems unhelpful: taking more time for discussion, checking 
that no mistakes have been made in the process of argumentation, and making sure 
that the facts on which views are based are accurate. Both in philosophy and in 
everyday deliberative democracy, it has been recognized over and over again that 
such interventions do not help the opposing sides closer to agreement. Disagreements 
that cannot be resolved through the use of argument and should be addressed by non-
rational persuasion have been called ʻdeep disagreementsʼ (Fogelin 1985, Adams 
2005, Duran 2016). These disagreements are deep since the competing positions 
seem to be incommensurable; they cannot be compared because they do not rely on 
the same rule-based way of making and legitimizing judgements.
That some disagreements in ethics are deep disagreements was first indicated by 
Robert J. Fogelin (1985: 5-6). He showed that although there might be a good deal of 
agreement about many facts related to abortion, there is no common ground, and in the 
background of the debate there are some contradictory framework propositions about 
definitions of life which make it impossible to reach agreement. The disagreement is 
not over some isolated propositions such as “The fetus is a person”, but instead over 
“a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles 
of acting and thinking)” that in his wording constitute a form of life (Fogelin 1985: 
6). Fogelin’s central thesis is that argumentative discourse necessarily occurs against 
a background of broadly shared beliefs, preferences and procedures for resolving 
disagreements, as well as shared commitments to producing compelling grounds. If 
this shared background is absent, and argumentative context becomes less normal, 
argument becomes impossible. Deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the 
use of argument as they are generated by conflicts between underlying principles 
or what Wittgenstein was inclined to call ‘rules’ or what Putnam called ‘framework 
propositions’ (Fogelin 1985: 5). 
1 An empirical study (Ahola 2017) which investigated accociations of human values with the readiness 
to question experts’ views showed that the reasons for disagreeing with experts are related to 
individual factors, situational factors, social risks and views about experts.
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Chris Ranalli (2018) has pointed out that recent discussion has tended to focus 
too much on the epistemic issues, such as whether deep disagreements are rationally 
resolvable, or whether deep disagreement supports epistemic relativism, instead of 
answering the metaphysical question of what deep disagreement consists of. The fact 
that some moral disagreements are not rationally resolvable raises both metaphysical 
and epistemological questions, whereas the answer to the metaphysical question 
may influence the way we answer the epistemological question. For example, if, 
given the nature of what one disagrees over in moral disagreements, it turns out that 
we are dealing with non-doxastic disagreements, this may also explain why they 
are not rationally resolvable. Or, if some moral disagreements turn out to be deep 
disagreements, this can also have important ramifications for the epistemological 
question.
2.1. Over what do we disagree?
Let us first try to find out what is the object of disagreement. Epistemologists 
(Frances and Matheson 2018) distinguish between 1) disagreements over what to 
believe (disagreement over the truth of a claim) and 2) disagreements over what to 
do (disagreement over an action). The first of these has been referred to as belief-
disagreement and the second, as action-disagreement. When it comes to belief-
disagreements, one has three possibilities: to believe it, disbelieve it, or to suspend 
judgement. With action-disagreements, one also has three options: to do X, not to do 
X, or to prevent doing X, while in cases when one is not able to decide whether to do 
X or not to do X, it amounts to the same thing as not doing X.
Bryan Frances has argued that although we can distinguish between belief-
disagreements and action-disagreements, for the sake of simplicity and uniformity 
action-disagreements can also be constructed as disagreements over what to believe. 
In this case the disagreement will be over the truth of the claim “One should do X” 
(Frances 2014: 76). Frances points out that it is important to remember that action-
disagreements are not identical with belief-disagreements, since besides belief the 
former also involve a choice about what one will in fact do, or what one actually 
ought to do. However, all things considered, Frances does not think that translating 
action-disagreements into belief-disagreements gets us in trouble. I believe that here 
Frances has overlooked the implications of the translation of action-disagreements 
into belief-disagreements, namely that action-disagreements involve one additional 
element: in order to do something, one needs to have a motivating reason to do so.
What does it mean for someone to have a motivating reason? There is a dispute 
between Humeans and anti-Humeans on what it is to have a motivating reason, 
whether we are just believers, desirers or, rather, besirers. To my mind Michael 
Smith (1994) has convincingly shown why Humeans are right that only an agent’s 
desires may constitute her motivating reasons. According to the dispositional theory 
of desire developed by Michael Smith (1994), desire means an agent’s propensity to 
take a given course of action. In order to show how motivating reasons are related 
to having goals and desires, Michael Smith (1994: 116) introduces following steps:
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1. Having a motivating reason is, inter alia, having a goal.
2. Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit. 
3. Being in a state with which the world must fit is desiring. 
It follows that having a motivating reason is, inter alia, desiring.
Timo Airaksinen (2016: 33) has shown how desires are connected with the agent’s 
values: the agent feels the pull toward the object because s/he registers his/her values 
and formulates the corresponding desire, which is a motivating factor for action. The 
values tell what the agent likes. But they also tell what the agent wants, and therefore 
they are a source of his/her experienced desirability (Airaksinen 2016: 35).
I hope that it has become clear why it is important to retain the distinction 
between belief-disagreements and action-disagreements. The answer is that action-
disagreements may be either disagreements on beliefs (when we disagree on the truth 
of the claim “One should do X”) or disagreements on desires (when we disagree, for 
example, on whether one finds it important to promote or honour some value). Later 
on, in part 4.3 of this article, I will show how different approaches to motivating 
reasons can lead to deep moral disagreements.
2.2. Moral conflicts are more like desires than like beliefs
Already more than half a century ago Bernard Williams pointed out in his article 
“Ethical consistency” (1965/1973a) that moral conflicts resemble conflicts of desires 
more than conflicts of beliefs. He foregrounds two aspects which should demonstrate 
this. First, our reactions upon noticing a conflict vary: if I find out that my beliefs are in 
conflict, this weakens either one or other of the beliefs, but the same does not happen 
with desires. The clash between desires arises from some contingent matter of fact 
which makes it impossible to satisfy both desires. In a situation in which one has to 
choose between two moral ‘oughts’, knowing that both apply but one cannot follow 
them both, there is a feeling of being ripped apart. One does not have this feeling 
in a situation where one has two different beliefs, except in a situation when one 
unconditionally wants to believe something. Secondly, when I finally make a decision 
about which of the two ‘oughts’ to follow, the result is a feeling of regret, similarly to 
when I decide to satisfy one desire and not another. Despite feeling that I did the best 
I could in the situation, I will still feel regret as I may continue to think retrospectively 
that these were both things that I ought to do (Williams 1965/1973a: 172).
Williams makes the critical point that a cognitivist construction of a conflict of 
obligations does not take the phenomenon of regret into account. This is because 
cognitivists treat moral conflicts as conflicts of belief, in which there is only one 
right choice. The whole endeavour is directed toward freeing oneself of the mistake 
whereby two contradictory ought-statements have been constructed. Often this is 
attributed to the affective element which one should get rid of.
That this is so can clearly be seen in realism proponent Russ Shafer-Landau’s 
argument that although realists claim that in a case of moral disagreement, one 
party makes a cognitive error, this would be over-intellectualisation. He confirms 
that “moral error is first and foremost a matter of conative misalignment” (Shafer-
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Landau 2005: 217). A moral error may indeed consist of acquiring a false belief, but 
there are also many other (affective) elements which lead to application of the wrong 
standards, such as emotions, moods, upbringing, cultural context, desires and lusts, 
dreams and fears, all of which play a role in a person’s moral beliefs. Shafer-Landau 
explains that moral error that involves attachment to false moral standards “often 
signals an affective misalignment as well” (Shafer-Landau 2005: 218).
It is typical of cognitivists that desires and emotions are represented as annoying 
intruders that make us diverge from a rational understanding of the ‘right’ moral 
standards. In the cognitivist view, the affective element that accompanies a moral 
decision should be eliminated, because it interferes with following objective 
standards. In addition to Bernard Williams (1973b), such an approach has been 
criticised by Martha Nussbaum (1986, 2001) and others, who have shown that 
emotions play an important role in morality. Also, several social scientists (Haidt 
2012, Bartels 2008) have stated that in moral and political questions, one has to do 
with non-rational disagreements, which are based on emotions and intuitions, and 
which refuse to submit to rational arguments. I think that these thinkers are right 
in that emotions do play an important role in moral and political disagreements. 
Emotions and desires are not only factors that have to be eliminated in order to reach 
a correct moral judgement; rather, they are essential elements of moral decision-
making and play a major role in moral conflicts.2
2.3. Moral conflicts, moral dilemmas and moral disagreements
Let us now clarify the relationship of moral conflicts, moral dilemmas, and 
moral disagreements. Moral conflicts are incidents in which there are two normative 
requirements as options – each entailing an action realizing a moral value and one 
has to find out in moral deliberation, for instance, in all things considered judgement, 
which requirement overrides the other and then act on the basis of this requirement. 
In a moral dilemma, none of the requirements overrides the other, even though both 
are binding. Moral dilemma is “a situation in which an agent S morally ought to do A 
and morally ought to do B, but cannot do both, either because B is just not-doing-A or 
because some contingent feature of the world prevents doing both” (Gowans 1987: 
3). Williams (1981) indicates that the difference between a moral conflict and moral 
dilemma is that in the first case one obligation can be genuinely outweighed, so that 
the disadvantaged party will not have justified complaint about what I chose to do, 
whereas in the case of moral dilemma there are conflicting moral requirements and 
neither of them succeeds in outweighing the other. Thus, this situation is ‘tragic’ as 
whatever the agent does there will be a moral residue (Williams 1981: 74).
Williams explains that by ‘moral conflict’ he means “cases where there is a conflict 
between two moral judgements that a man is disposed to make relevant to deciding 
2 In a previous article, “What role do emotions play in moral disagreements?” (Sutrop 2016) I have 
shown that since emotions lead one to see things in a particular way, in case of moral disagreements it 
is important to put oneself imaginatively in the other person’s shoes to understand where the emotion 
comes from. In order to resolve a disagreement, one should aim to change other person’s emotions 
related to the debated issue or to revise one’s own emotional repertoire.
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what to do” (1965/1973a). He shows that moral conflicts can take two forms: in the 
first form I ought to do both a and b, but I cannot do both; in the second form I ought 
to do c in respect of some of its features but in respect of its other features I should 
not do c. In the case of a moral dilemma both ‘oughts’ apply but they cannot be acted 
upon. This shows that the two ‘oughts’ are incompatible. This is what makes moral 
dilemmas irresolvable (Williams 1965/1973a: 171).
Although most moral dilemmas involve just one person, sometimes dilemmas 
are faced by a group of people who have to decide what to do in case of conflicting 
obligations. For instance, in the case of Covid-19 pandemic a situation developed 
in several countries with insufficient intensive care beds for all who needed them, 
and doctors were put in the situation where they were not able to fulfil both the duty 
of beneficence and the duty of non-maleficence. In the circumstance where the life-
saving treatment of one patient had to be stopped in order to give respiratory support 
to another with a more positive medical prognosis, the hospital and doctors working 
in intensive care faced a moral dilemma: they had to fulfil the duty to help and at the 
same time fulfil the duty not to harm. Whatever the doctors did, they had a feeling 
that it was wrong as they were not able to do everything that should have been done 
for their patients. Such situation is tragic in its essence and puts great psychological 
pressure on health care providers (Sutrop and Simm 2020: 255).
According to Bernard Williams moral conflicts can be one-party or two-party 
conflicts (1981: 72). One-party conflict refers to the conflict of obligations in one 
person. Moral disagreements are two-party moral conflicts in which the parties have 
conflicting judgements about determinately specified actions. The parties involved 
in the dispute disagree over what to do in the case of conflicting moral obligations. 
Sometimes the parties in these disputes experience or have experienced internal (one-
person) moral conflict before they came to the decision which obligation outweighs 
the other.
The debate on moral conflicts is as old as history of philosophy. Moral conflicts 
occur in theories that involve more than one principle. Pluralists believe that moral 
conflicts are inevitable, and that there are many alternative ways of resolving 
such conflicts as there is no overriding value (Kekes 1993: 53ff). Moral pluralism 
opposes the monistic view “that all moral conflicts can be resolved on the basis of 
the overriding value whose authority all reasonable people should recognize” (Kekes 
1993: 53). Although nobody denies that there are apparent moral conflicts, monist 
philosophical theories, among them utilitarians and Kantians assume that they are 
not genuine and can be resolved with the help of the ultimate principle as the source 
of moral obligation. Value pluralists believe that there are genuine moral conflicts 
as there is incommensurability of moral values. Incommensurability may mean 
different things but the core claim is that “there is no currency in terms of which 
each conflict of values can be resolved; and that there is no value, which can be 
appealed to, independent of the conflicting values; and no conflict can be rationally 
resolved (Williams 1981: 77). Moral pluralism differs also from the relativist 
view that all things have value only with respect to a particular cultural context or 
situation. Relativists deny that there is a uniquely correct answer to resolving moral 
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conflicts, they “hold that social convention plays an ineliminable role in selecting 
which values a group’s morality emphasizes the most and in dealing with conflicts 
between important values” (Wong 2006: 374).
Although in case of one-party moral conflicts it is assumed that the rational agent 
will be able to solve or at least reduce conflict in his/her personal set of values to 
a minimum, in Williams’s view this is unreasonable, since conflicts of values are 
“expressions of a complex inheritance of values, from different social sources, 
and what we experience in ourselves as a conflict is something which could have 
been, and perhaps was, expressed as a conflict between two societies, or between 
two historical states of one society” (Williams 1981: 72-3). Interpersonal conflicts 
in society are disagreements which in Williams’s view are similar to one-person 
conflicts, expressing clashes of values and value systems of different origin. He 
points out that it is often wrongly assumed that each party has their own harmonious 
set of value-beliefs, and that they will be able to resolve the conflict rationally.
A similar view has been expressed by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) who argues that 
disagreements on a variety of ethical issues are the result of the fact that we have 
inherited fragments of heterogenous moral theories that we cannot put in harmony 
as these theories have their roots in different social contexts.
3. What is universal and what is culturally specific about values?
3.1. What are values?
Although value is a central concept of ethics and various social sciences, it is 
rarely defined. Sometimes the word ‘value’ is used narrowly as a synonym for the 
words ‘good’ and ‘valuable’, and at other times as a reference for the whole scale of 
evaluatory terms, at one end of which are positive, at the other negative values. In 
order to avoid verbal disagreement where people are talking past each other, it would 
be important to clarify what we mean by value. 
Let us start with etymology. The word ‘value’ comes from the Latin word valere, 
meaning to be worthy (Bond 2001: 1745). Thus, in its most general meaning a value 
is something worthy, which is worth having, getting or doing, or that possesses some 
property or properties that make it so. Values are action-guiding, as we take them into 
account when making decisions and when planning activities. If a value is something 
that guarantees individual well-being and flourishing, there is an internal relation 
between the concept of value and the concept of good. However, this relational 
account of values is challenged if there is such a thing as intrinsic value (Bond 2001: 
1745). While intrinsic values (e.g. beauty, the good will, happiness) are things that 
have value in their own right, instrumental values are things that contribute to human 
flourishing, survival, growth, or the well-being of human beings, and mixed values 
are simultaneously good in themselves as well as being vehicles for attaining other 
things considered to be good (e.g. health or knowledge).
Philosophers also debate about whether values are subjective or objective. They 
ask whether certain things are valuable because we desire them, or whether we 
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desire them because they are valuable. And last but not least, there are arguments as 
to whether every culture has its own values or own rankings of values, or whether 
there are at least some values that apply always and everywhere.
Francesco Orsi (2015: 7-8) has shown that the word ‘value’ may refer to three 
different things: (1) the object or state of affairs that has value, (ii) the features that 
make an object or state of affairs valuable, and (iii) the fact that an object or state of 
affairs has value (is good, bad, etc.).
Traditional axiology deals with the questions concerning what things are good, 
how good they are, and how their goodness is related to one another (Schroeder 2016). 
Contemporary philosophers have mostly been interested in the nature of value and 
its relation to other moral categories, such as right, reason, rational, and ought, and 
whether these deontic categories are posterior or prior to the evaluative categories.
In his book Value theory (2015), Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative 
concepts used in everyday speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse with 
special attention to different forms of fitting attitude theory. The basic idea behind 
the fitting attitude account is that good is closely linked to ‘desirable’. Orsi shows 
that evaluative and normative dimensions of value are interlinked. As normativity is 
one of the fundamental properties of value, for something to be good means nothing 
more than that there are reasons to respond favourably to it (Orsi 2015: 11). For 
instance, to consider a certain conduct to be morally good implies that there is some 
reason to admire it. A general rule is that a positive value is to be responded to with 
a positive attitude while a negative value entails a negative attitude.
There are several types of values: biological-physical values (life, health, 
environment), socio-political values (freedom, justice, tolerance, cultural diversity), 
moral values (honesty, caring, goodness, human dignity), and aesthetic values 
(beauty, symmetry). For discussing moral matters, it is useful to distinguish between 
moral and non-moral values; moral values secure the well-being of other people, and 
non-moral values are beneficial to the agent.
Because there is such a multiplicity of values, the question arises of inter-
relationships among them, i.e. whether values can be (in)comparable and (in)
commensurable. Value (in)commensurability entails two further issues: the way 
one should relate moral values to each other and what one should do in cases of 
conflict (Viganò and Vallauri 2020: 87). For monists, a single scale enables the 
agent to compare conflicting oughts and reduce different values to one ultimate 
value. For example, most utilitarian and Kantian theories are monist and identify, 
respectively, either happiness/utility or respect as the ultimate value. According to 
pluralists such an ultimate value does not exist. They argue that many values are 
characterized by incommensurability or incomparability. For Joseph Raz (1986: 
329) the idea of incommensurability entails the idea of incomparability: when two 
things are incommensurable, they cannot be meaningfully compared. This view was 
questioned by James Griffin (1986: 77) arguing that although two things cannot be 
measured by any common scale of value, we can still compare and rank them. Ruth 
Chang claims that these terms are distinct: the term ‘incommensurable’ should be 
reserved for items that cannot be precisely measured by some common scale of units 
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of value and the term ‘incomparable’ for items that cannot be compared because no 
positive value relation holds between them (Chang 1997: 2). Positive value relation 
is the judgement that between two options one is either better than the other or they 
have equal value (Chang 1997: 4).
T. K. Seung and Daniel Bonevac (1992) have made a suggestion that we should 
distinguish between ‘incommensurate ranking’ where comparing of values is done 
in reference to some particular value-measure, and ‘indeterminate ranking’ where 
one considers all things and makes the on-balance comparison of two values. They 
argue that “instead of one right solution, indeterminate ranking offers a range 
of right solutions” (Seung and Bonevac 1992: 802). Thus, some pluralists argue 
that it is possible to arrange values according to their relative importance, but the 
bases of prioritizing among them, arranging them in a hierarchy are also multiple 
(the concept of the plurality of measures). It is believed that if some things really 
are incomparable and incommensurable, then value pluralism could explain why 
(Schroeder 2016). However, as practical life requires being able to make choices and 
solve value conflicts, this makes monism attractive. It has been argued that pluralism 
typically appeals to those who want to explain why moral conflicts arise, whereas 
monism appeals to those who seek to organise the precepts of morality without moral 
remainders (Brunning 2019).
3.2. Value priorities of different cultures
It is noteworthy that philosophers have not been much interested in how people 
in real life make value choices and what they value in different cultures. Since 1981 
a worldwide network of social scientists has conducted representative national 
surveys of people’s values and beliefs in almost 100 countries as part of the World 
Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2014). The World Values Survey measures support 
for democracy and gender equality, tolerance of foreigners and ethnic minorities, the 
role of religion, attitudes toward the environment, work, family, politics, national 
identity, diversity, culture, and subjective well-being. On the basis of the World 
Values Survey data, political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005) 
developed a cultural map of the world which shows how closely linked cultural 
values vary between societies in two major dimensions: traditional versus secular-
rational values on the vertical y-axis and survival versus self-expression values on 
the horizontal x-axis. Moving upward on this map reflects a shift from traditional to 
secular-rational values and moving toward the right reflects a shift from survival to 
self-expression values. Traditional values emphasize the importance of religiosity, 
national pride, family values, respect for authority and obedience. Secular-rational 
values stress autonomy. Support of traditional values leads one to reject divorce, 
abortion, euthanasia and suicide, while those who support secular-rational values 
are more likely to accept them. Survival values involve a priority of security over 
liberty, non-acceptance of homosexuality, distrust in outsiders and abstinence from 
political action. Self-expression values involve prioritization of individual freedom 
and activist political orientation (environmental protection, speaking out for gender 
equality, sexual minorities), and toleration of foreigners.
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The Inglehart-Welzel cultural map helps us to understand why we have so 
many moral disagreements over a variety of issues. The data show that much of the 
variation in human values between societies boils down to these broad dimensions: 
traditional vs secular-rational values and survival vs self-expression values 
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As basic living conditions differ much more between 
than within societies, as do the experiences of existential security and individual 
agency, the societal differences are greater than the individual ones. Being aware of 
this fact, we could be better prepared to deal with value conflicts between societies. 
If our different views are embedded in deeply rooted value systems which have 
been influenced by socio-economic conditions, the level of modernization, or our 
relationship to religion, convergence of values may only take place as a result of 
long-term socio-economic and cultural changes.
At the same time it is clear that cultures are not homogeneous, and there are also 
large individual differences within societies along such cleavage lines as gender, 
generation, ethnicity, religious denomination, education, income, etc. People’s 
priorities shift from traditional to secular-rational values as their sense of existential 
security increases or backwards from secular-rational values to traditional values 
as the feeling of security decreases. The move from survival values towards self-
expression values requires the increase of the sense of individual agency. This has 
a direct influence on how we think of the issues of abortion, euthanasia, gay and 
lesbian partnerships or animal rights. As we know, these are the issues that most 
often lead to moral disagreements.
The empirical studies on values also show that our values are of various derivations 
and can form very different sets. However, even if our values are deeply embedded 
in our socio-economic and cultural settings as well as dependent on our individual 
life situations, there is always some room for reflection, individual judgement and 
moral deliberation which can influence our views on moral issues. People’s mind 
can be changed by values education (Sutrop 2015), through the means like art, and 
literature, or personal activism – by standing as a representative of the values one 
endorses (Marino 2017).
4. What are the possible sources of moral disagreements?
Let us now come back to the question over what we may disagree when we 
talk about moral matters. It has been pointed out by Frederico Zuolo and Giulia 
Bistagnino (2018: 597) that in deep normative disagreements the parties involved 
may disagree either about the substantive content of the issue under dispute (first-
level disagreement), or about the correct justificatory reasons for their contrary 
claims (second-level disagreements). Using the example of the death penalty they 
show that it is possible to have a second-order disagreement even when the parties 
agree on the first level. In this case the disputants may agree on the first level that the 
death penalty is morally wrong but provide different justifications for this judgement 
(Zuolo and Bistagnino 2018: 598). In the following, I will show what can cause our 
disagreements both on the first and second level. 
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4.1. Disagreements caused by our different identities and concepts of the good life
Firstly, we may disagree about our judgement of the subject matter as we have 
different concepts of the good life. We also differ regarding what kind of persons we 
want to be. This general claim can be divided into several subquestions. (1) Which 
character traits are important to us? (2) Which moral principles do we consider 
important? (3) Which roles we identify with (professional roles, roles in family life, 
other personal relationships or society)? (4) To whom do we want to be loyal – to 
which persons, institutions, or to oneself? Also, we have differences in the following 
aspects: (5) What we believe in (i.e. religious beliefs), and (6) What is important to 
us (how we relate to power, achievement, tradition, hedonism, conformity, security); 
(7) What aims we have in our lives. 
Already Isaiah Berlin argued that moral debates are not like debates over taste 
in the form of “I prefer coffee, you prefer champagne”, which epistemologists 
today call ‘faultless disagreements’3 rather, they are debates over deeper identities 
(Berlin 1947/2013: 11). Moral disagreements are not about who is right or wrong, but 
about different identities and incompatible human goals. In his famous essay “Two 
concepts of liberty” (1958/2002) Isaiah Berlin argued that the freedom to choose 
between ultimate values makes us human. Value conflicts are frequent because we 
want to realize incompatible human goals. Politics and political theory have been 
invented because of men’s disagreements about the ends of life. In “The pursuit of 
the ideal” (1947/2013) Berlin writes: 
What is clear is that values can clash – that is why civilizations are 
incompatible. They can be incompatible between cultures, groups within 
the same culture, or between you and me. You believe in always telling the 
truth, no matter what: I do not, because I believe that it can sometimes be 
too painful and too destructive to do. We can discuss each other’s point of 
view, we can try to reach common ground, but in the end what you pursue 
may not be reconcilable with the ends to which I find that I have dedicated 
my life (Berlin 1947/2013: 12).
Values can also come into conflict within a civilisation and give rise to intense 
arguments that do not necessarily resolve by deciding that one value is unconditionally 
wrong and the other right. For one person, justice may be the only value while for 
another, compassion and caring may be just as important, while not setting justice 
aside. Both liberty and equality are important values, “but total liberty for wolves is 
death to the lambs, total liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with 
the rights to a decent existence of the weak and the less gifted” (Berlin 1947/2013: 
12-13).
Axiological dissent is rooted in our very identity, according to Berlin: “These 
collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and what we are” (1947/2013: 
13). He strongly insists that one should not look for one ultimate solution. If someone 
were to promise that it is possible to overcome these contradictions and that in some 
3 A disagreement is ‘faultless’ when no party in a dispute needs to be mistaken.
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ideal world it is possible to harmonise all good things, then this in itself is forcing 
one’s values on someone else, declaring them to be the only ones that are right. 
Incidentally, Berlin says that achievement of such complete harmony of values is 
not only unattainable but conceptually incoherent. This is how he explains it: “Some 
among the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed 
to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss” (Berlin 1947/2013: 114). 
If Berlin is right about conflicting identities and the clash of fundamental values, 
then our moral disagreements are not apparent but deep disagreements.
4.2. Disagreements caused by incommensurable fundamental values
That our concepts of the good life and the good person are related to our 
fundamental values, has been suggested also by Thomas Nagel (1979) who 
distinguished between five fundamental types of value that give rise to a basic 
conflict. These types are (1) specific obligations to other people or institutions; (2) 
constraints on action deriving from general rights that everyone has; (3) considering 
and taking into account all aspects of benefit and harm to all people or all sentient 
beings (utility); (4) the intrinsic value of certain achievements or creations; (5) 
commitment to one’s own projects or undertakings (Nagel 1979: 130).
Nagel says that these values enter our decisions on a daily basis, and we see constant 
conflicts among them and within them. Although attempts have been made to resolve 
such conflicts by arranging values in a particular order or subsuming some points of view 
to others, in Nagel’s opinion this cannot succeed because values have fundamentally 
different kind of sources, and therefore we are confronted with incommensurable 
claims. Conflicts arise because the sources of value commitments are deeply different 
and they represent different points of view: individual, relational, impersonal, or ideal 
(Nagel 1979: 134). And all these ways of seeing the world – from the point of view 
of one’s relations to others, across a lifetime, of everyone at once and from a detached 
viewpoint – are equally human characteristics. Moral conflicts are created by a disparity 
between the fragmentation of value and the singleness of decision.
These values may collide within a single type, as suggested by Nagel, or among 
different types, and there is no single overarching value to which different values 
can be reduced. In all five of Nagel’s types there is the question of how important 
one or another kind of responsibility is to one or another person. The preference 
may also differ with the situation. In order to make a decision about what to do we 
have to find a balance between conflicting values. But this act of balancing has its 
basis in our conception of good life and depends on which kind of person we want 
to be. Also, I think that Nagel has put his finger on something really important when 
distinguishing between different types of values, he correlates them with different 
kinds of motivating reasons for moral action which may easily become a source of 
moral conflicts.
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4.3. Disagreement over motivating reasons
Thirdly, moral theories differ on which motivating reasons they provide for moral 
actions. Philip Pettit (1989) has drawn our attention to the fact that consequentialists 
and deontologists may share a theory of the good but they differ in the theory of the 
right, the theory of what makes us choose between different options (Pettit 1989: 
117). That consequentialists and deontologists give different reasons for action 
has first been demonstrated by Stanley Benn in A theory of freedom (1988). Benn 
distinguished between person-centred and value-centred reasons (1988: 6-11). 
Person-centred reasons involve commitment to certain principles in our dealings 
with other people, quite irrespective of the outcomes of our conforming to these 
principles. Examples of person-centred reasons may be respect for freedom, justice, 
equal regard, or fidelity to truth. Value-centred reasons involve considerations of 
how to promote certain values or certain valuable properties. This will mean aiming 
to maximize certain goods such as personal freedoms or equal opportunities.
Philip Pettit (1989) developed this distinction further with the focus on value. 
Pettit argues that deontological and teleological ethical theories differ in their 
response to values: whereas deontologists tell us to honour a value, teleologists 
suggest that we promote a value. For example, promoting a value such as honesty 
means to aim to bring along a certain consequence, to increase truthfulness in the 
world, by encouraging as many people as possible to be honest. Honouring honesty 
means striving to be as honest as possible toward oneself, to respect the principle of 
honesty in one’s own life and to refrain from lying. Promoting a value focuses not so 
much on the agent as on maximizing the value itself. Thus, in honouring a value, the 
agent acts on the basis of an agent-relative reason, while in promoting a value, the 
agent acts on an agent-neutral reason.
Although both the consequentialist and the deontologist may respond to the value 
of honesty by exemplifying it in their life and actions, her/his reasons for doing 
so are different. Such different reasons for action may sometimes lead to moral 
disagreements about what one ought to do. While honouring a value is also a way 
of promoting it, devoting oneself to fostering a value may mean focusing only on 
preventing more lies being told without thereby promoting truthfulness (one may 
be allowed to lie in order to reduce lies in the world). In addition, it may involve 
promoting truthfulness in one’s own life, that is, a disposition not to lie.
Another example for demonstrating the contrast between the agent-relative 
(honouring a value) and agent-neutral (promoting a value) injunctions would 
be the example of killing. The question that may divide consequentialists from 
deontologists, is their attitudes to the question of whether it is permissible to kill in 
order to save more lives. “The agent-relative (AR) injunction requires that you not 
kill; the agent-neutral (AN) rule requires that you kill if you can thereby decrease the 
net amount of killing” (McNaughton and Rawling 1992: 836).
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4.4. Disagreement over what makes some action or character  
trait morally good or bad
Fourthly, moral disagreements may be caused by our different conceptions of 
morality. Whereas deontological ethicists construe morality in terms of duties and 
conflicts, and teleological ethicists focus on consequences, virtue ethicists construe 
morality in terms of virtues, ideals and ways of life. Michael Stocker has shown 
that what matters for Aristotelian virtue ethics is not an act-evaluation which is 
action-guiding but such an act-evaluation that also involves agent evaluation and 
the evaluation of moral emotions proper to each of the conflicting act-evaluations 
(Stocker 1990: 117). From this we can conclude that the moral theories disagree on 
whether morality is a matter of what I should do or a matter of what kind of person I 
should be and what kind of emotions I should feel.
Thus, some moral disagreements have their origin in the fact that there are different 
views on what makes an act morally good. Paul Walker and Terence Lovat (2018) 
have pointed out that historically there have been a variety of different positions on 
what makes an action or a character trait morally good, permissible, or obligatory. 
They remind us that a variety of suggestions have been made: 
From a historical perspective, in the classical epoch, ethical appeal was 
made to the polis or to gods. In the medieval era, it was made to God. In the 
modern era ethical appeal in Western settings looks towards the rational 
framework of deontology, teleology or virtue ethics, among others. Under 
these frameworks, the moral permissibility of an act or decision depends 
either on the intrinsic nature of the act (i.e. we make choices to act on the 
basis of a maxim which has universal validity for every rational being, and 
so we cannot use others merely as a means to an end) or on the consequences 
of the act or decision (i.e. we make choices to act which potentially offer 
the greatest net benefit for the greatest number of people) or we seek to 
proportionately balance duties or rules with empirical consequences in 
order to find the virtuous mean in the situation at hand (Walker and Lovat 
2018: 45).
If we take the example of the death penalty, Kantian ethicists will focus on the 
act itself (killing is wrong, because every human being has human dignity), while 
utilitarian ethicists will be concerned about the consequences of the act (they may 
argue that death penalty is not effective punishment: the criminal may not be afraid 
of dying but more afraid of the perspective of spending the whole life in prison or 
that it causes more killing); virtue ethicists will most likely argue that what matters 
is how the act is related to the emotions related to the act (as death penalty is a sort 
of revenge and is related to anger and fear, it is not moral).
When representatives of different theories speak about an action as ‘morally 
good’ they may refer to various properties: the character of an actor, the motive, the 
consequence of an action or the action itself. The different focus of attention is also 
reflected in the language used in various moral theories: right or wrong, good or bad, 
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virtuous or vicious. Can we classify these as merely verbal disagreements? I do not 
think so. These disagreements are not caused by a communicative error, where the 
representatives of different ethical theories simply talk past each other, as is typical 
of merely verbal disagreements. Different theories prioritize different aspects of 
moral action: whereas consequentialists concentrate on consequences, deontological 
theories put stress on the moral worth of an action, and virtue ethicists evaluate 
the character of the actor. Thus, it is not a merely verbal disagreement that we see 
here but deep conceptual disagreement, as it proceeds from a clash in underlying 
principles.
5. Conclusions
We have seen that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual disagreements 
which, similarly to disagreements in logic, are not resolvable, for the resolution of 
the disagreement requires the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually 
unavailable to them. I suggested four possible sources of moral disagreements: 
firstly, we may have different identities and concepts of good life, secondly, we have 
incommensurable fundamental values; thirdly, we may have different motivating 
reasons for moral actions, and fourthly, we may have different concepts of morality.
People differ not only in how they decide to act when confronted with value 
choices, but also in how they justify their choices. Sometimes people choose the 
same option but provide different justificatory reasons for it. Some refer continuously 
to considerations of utility or concern about others’ welfare, while others say that 
it is important to do the right thing. Some are oriented to good relationships with 
other people, and others work on consensus-building; still others find it important to 
exemplify certain virtues. The justifications of their choices also reveal their loyalties 
and worldview.
Why is it important to know that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual 
disagreements? Firstly, this will show that the persistence of disagreements over 
moral issues does not prove that objectivism and realism are wrong as in ethics 
there may be no unique answer to moral questions. Secondly, this will have practical 
consequences. If it is not possible to resolve moral disagreements by rational 
argumentation, we should understand what causes our disagreements, what we have 
in common and on what basis we can build consensus or make compromises.
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